Seminar series of the Finance Economics and Econometrics Lab Speaker: Pierre Mella-Barral (TBS Business School). Title: “Informational Hold-up by Venture Capital Syndicates” joint with Suting Hong (ShanghaiTech). Date: Thursday, November 18th at 12h30...
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Seminar series of the Finance Economics and Econometrics Lab Speaker: Pierre Mella-Barral (TBS Business School). Title: “Informational Hold-up by Venture Capital Syndicates” joint with Suting Hong (ShanghaiTech). Date: Thursday, November 18th at 12h30 (Paris Time). Abstract: We develop a theory of informational hold-up by lending VC syndicates, in the spirit of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992). The theory can explain and relate the empirical observations that (a) early round syndicates regularly associate VCs with different levels of experience and (b) follow-on syndicates often involve none of the early round VCs. Consistent with the theory, we find empirically that the heterogeneity of VC experience levels in a syndicate is (i) negatively related to the extent to which outside VCs trust in the entrepreneur and (ii) positively related to the likelihood of syndicate switching in a later round. You will find the paper attached. You are cordially invited to participate to the seminar, whic
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