Correa-Fare Evasion in Transit Networks

arXiv:1405.2826v1[cs.GT]12May2014 Fare Evasion in Transit Networks Jos´e R. Correa1 , Tobias Harks2 , Vincent J.C. Kreuzen2 , and Jannik Matuschke3 1 Departamento de Ingenier´ıa Industrial, Universidad de Chile 2 School of Business and Economics, Maastricht... More

arXiv:1405.2826v1[cs.GT]12May2014 Fare Evasion in Transit Networks Jos´e R. Correa1 , Tobias Harks2 , Vincent J.C. Kreuzen2 , and Jannik Matuschke3 1 Departamento de Ingenier´ıa Industrial, Universidad de Chile 2 School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University 3 Institut f¨ur Mathematik, Technische Universit¨at Berlin Abstract. Public transit systems in urban areas usually require large state subsidies, primarily due to high fare evasion rates. In this paper, we study new models for optimizing fare inspection strategies in transit networks based on bilevel programming. In the first level, the leader (the network operator) determines probabilities for inspecting passengers at different locations, while in the second level, the followers (the fare-evading passengers) respond by optimizing their routes given the inspection probabilities and travel times. To model the followers’ behavior we study both a non-adaptive variant, in which passengers select a path a priori and continue alo Less