The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
Evidence of Inaction
This memorandum serves as a vivid account of the differing perspectives and postures of the players engaged in the response to the crisis in Rwanda, complete with exclamation marks indicating...
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The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994
Evidence of Inaction
This memorandum serves as a vivid account of the differing perspectives and postures of the players engaged in the response to the crisis in Rwanda, complete with exclamation marks indicating the memo drafter’s incredulity at a participant’s remarks. The interagency teleconference on Rwanda occurred daily, serving an information exchange function and an option vetting function. Attending from the Pentagon side at this meeting are officials from the Middle East/Africa office, the peacekeeping/peace enforcement office, and the office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict, in addition to military members of the Joint Staff. This report demonstrates the gulf between the views of the State Department and National Security Council officials and the views of Pentagon and military officials: “the meeting degenerated into a NSC/State attempt to sign-up the Principals to support a Chapter VII
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